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INTRODUCTION
Taxation is often a realm of politics. Nowhere is it more manifest than
in U.S. international tax policy. One cannot find a clear, single concept that
drives such policy, and the rules are often described in terms such as “hybrid”
and “compromise,” reflecting the politics behind their enactment.1
The core of the international tax rules of the United States, however, has
not changed much since its inception in the beginning of the last century,
with two notable exceptions: the Subpart F legislation in the beginning of the
1960s2 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Creation Act of 2017 (TCJA).3 Still, the
United States generally taxes its residents and citizens on their worldwide
income and provides relief for double taxation in the form of foreign tax
credits. These credits are granted on a unilateral basis and are limited solely
to cases where abuse is a concern or when the administrative burden involved
in checking the authenticity of foreign tax payments is considered excessive.4
In addition, the regime rather strictly adheres to three axioms: first, that nonresidents, non-citizens are taxed solely on their U.S. source income; second,
the separate corporate personality metaphor, which means that foreign
corporations are not taxed on their worldwide income; and, third, taxation
based on the arm’s length standard, which means that cross-border relatedparty transactions are viewed as if conducted on the market, using
comparability analysis.
The first significant departure from this general architecture of the U.S.
international tax rules could be tracked to the enactment of Subpart F, which
significantly gnawed at the above-mentioned axioms by taxing income of
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. persons in instances where such income’s nontaxation (by the United States) or deferral were considered potentially
unjustified.5 The legal construct of attributing such income directly to U.S.

1

See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 2 (2014).

2

Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.

3

Budget Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.

4

I.R.C. §§ 901–09.

5

For more on the significance of the change effected by the enactment of Subpart F, see, e.g.,
Richard J. Horwich, The Constitutionality of Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, 19 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 400 (1965).
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shareholders could not mask the anti-abuse nature of these rules. Subpart F
is a good example of the political nature of tax law since it came about as a
compromise between the Kennedy administration, who wanted to completely
eliminate deferral and Congress and industry who cared about the so-called
competitiveness of U.S. multinational enterprises (MNE) in a world where
other countries’ MNEs were not burdened by similar rules.6 Consequently,
only the less-justified forms of deferral became subject to this regime.
The second significant departure is the TCJA, which on the one hand
enacted a participation exemption,7 a clear departure from the century-long
reliance on foreign tax credits to relieve double taxation in the United States,
and on the other hand expanded the worldwide taxation of U.S. taxpayers
beyond potentially abusive deferral, currently taxing income from clearly
non-abusive direct investment abroad.8 Moreover, the latter rules, known as
the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) rules, provided for only
partial elimination of double taxation.9 Finally, the TCJA deviated from the
traditional taxation of foreign income at a single rate with a complex system
of multiple possible rates, and from the traditional reliance on market prices
and market comparability with the use of formulary elements to calculate
some items of income.10 Again, the complexity of the TCJA and its partial
departures from the traditional norms enhanced the hybridity of the
international tax rules of the United States.
The two departures from the core architecture of the international tax
rules are qualitatively different. The anti-abuse nature of Subpart F (and other
anti-deferral rules) can be viewed as supportive of the primary rules, and
indeed many other countries using similar norms eventually adopted

6

Id. at 400–01.

7

I.R.C. § 245A.

8

I.R.C. § 951A.

9

I.R.C. § 960(d).

10

The recent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project even came close to recommending
the adoption of CFC rules, eventually providing only “best practices” for countries on the adoption of
CFC rules. See OECD, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES ACTION 3: 2015
FINAL REPORT (2015). The European Union went a step further mandating CFC legislation from its
Members States. See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
Implementation of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, at 4, COM (2020) 383 final
(Aug. 19, 2020).
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Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) legislation of some kind.11 Moreover,
Subpart F maintained the integrity and the net income nature of the entire
income tax regime. The TCJA signaled a complete change of philosophy,
turbocharging the complexity of the regime, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, stirring the incentives created by the rules like never before. Its
impact is particularly important since it was enacted at a uniquely turbulent
time for the international tax regime, which has been facing critique over its
inability to deal with globalization and most importantly with the changes to
the global economy as a result of the digital revolution it is facing. That
critique led to the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project.12 In fact,
it is common knowledge that the TCJA international tax rules were crafted
to influence the BEPS project.13 Nonetheless, the TCJA did not respond to
these changes and indeed has had only a minute influence on the BEPS
project thus far.14
The pressure to reform the U.S. international tax policy is not new, and
the TCJA was preceded by many proposals for international tax reform
(promoted by both Republicans and Democrats)15 and ample academic
criticism, all decrying the incompatibility of the international tax policy of

11

See, e.g., CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS LEGISLATION (Georg Kofler et al. eds., 2020).

12

The project’s outcomes are available online. International Collaboration to End Tax Avoidance,
OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
13
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A Positive Dialectic: BEPS and the United States, 114 AJIL
UNBOUND 255, 255 (2020).
14
But note that the post-BEPS work on the challenges presented by the digital economy to the
international tax regime was affected by the TCJA and may adopt some of its features. See, e.g.,
Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” Under Pillar One, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps/public-consultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified-approach-pillar-one.pdf; Global AntiBase Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”)—Pillar Two, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/publicconsultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified-approach-pillar-one.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Global
Anti-Base Erosion Proposal].
15
For analysis and description of the types of reform preceding the TCJA, see, for example, JANE
G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL34115, REFORM OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION:
ALTERNATIVES (2017). See also, for example, the Obama Administrations proposals, such as the Fiscal
Year 2016 Revenue Proposals. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIONS FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS (Feb. 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf; Tax Reform Act of 2014,
H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014).
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the United States and its economic position in the world.16 In simple terms,
the policy had been largely crafted for a country that was at the time a large
net capital exporter (as well as a world leading exporter of goods and
services), whereas now the United States has been a net capital importer since
the 1980s.
This changing economic position of the United States has not affected
its international tax policy. Although impure, such policy has been, and to a
large extent still is, dominated by the idea of Capital Export Neutrality
(CEN), compatible with an emphasis on (worldwide) residence-based
taxation and antithetical to taxation at source.17 In simple terms, the United
States has been generally guided by the belief that what’s good for our MNE
is good for us.18 This belief was transformed into rules that reduced the tax
burden on exporters.19 As already mentioned, conflicting political
considerations and concern about abuse acted to limit CEN,20 leading to the
hybrid system we have now.
Still, these limits on CEN have not resulted in true reform that is
compatible with the United States’ now almost forty-year position as a net
capital importer. This Article contributes to the vast scholarship and policy
measures addressing this incompatibility with an analysis of a contemporary
aspect: the U.S. response to the challenges of taxing the digital economy. A
global effort to harmonize the taxation of the digital economy poses a serious
concern for the United States since it seems to be directed mainly at U.S.

16
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 269 (2001).
17
See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S.
CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS A POLICY STUDY 31 (2000). For more explanation and critique
of CEN, see, for example, David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy, 68
NAT’L TAX J. 635, 640 (2015); Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality: Reconsiderations, 27 VA.
TAX REV. 203, 203 (2007); Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 TAX L.
REV. 99, 100 (2011).
18
See, e.g., Laura Tyson, They Are Not Us: Why American Ownership Still Matters, THE AM.
PROSPECT (Dec. 5, 2000), https://prospect.org/world/us-american-ownership-still-matters/.
19
See, for example, regimes such as the Western Hemisphere Corporations, DISC, FSC, and ETI.
For a short history of these regimes, see, for example, Bruce A. Daigh et al., State Tax Issues Associated
with the Extraterritorial Income Regime, 9 ST. & LOC. TAX LAW. 1 (2004).
20

See Tyson, supra note 18.
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MNEs.21 Yet, the failure of this global effort leaves us with a state of affairs
that may not be more desirable, where countries impose domestic (typically
source-based) measures directed at U.S. MNEs.22 Unlike a coordinated
source-based measure, these (“digital”) taxes are as diverse as the growing
number of countries adopting them, with similarly different compliance
requirements, and therefore pose a significant cost to the MNE. Moreover,
for the most part these taxes are presented in new forms (most notably socalled Digital Service Taxes (“DST”) of different kinds), whose treatment
under the current rules is uncertain (e.g., they are probably not creditable),23
and often manifest as interim measures that further increase uncertainty for
both MNEs and other governments. These developments are taking place
while the United States, with the richest domestic market, continues to sit on
the fence in its traditional stance.24 This Article echoes previous critiques of
the United States’ general policy favoring residence taxation but concedes
that this is complicated by the country’s present domination of the digital
market.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the traditional U.S.
international tax policy, followed by Part II that highlights the impact of the
TCJA on such policy. Part III provides context to the proposals made by this
Article with a discussion of the international discourse over the challenges
that the digital economy presents to the international tax regime, while Part
IV exposes and explains the role of the United States in this discourse.
Finally, the Article concludes with modest proposals for U.S. action in
response to the challenges presented by digital economy to its tax rules,
proposals that could finally also consider the true position of the United
States in the global economy.

21
See, e.g., Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Digital Services Taxes, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,709
(June 5, 2020).
22
See, e.g., Letter from Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to José Ángel Gurria, OECD
Sec’y-Gen. (Dec. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Letter from Secretary Mnuchin].
23
See, e.g., Peter A. Barnes & H. David Rosenbloom, Digital Services Taxes: How Did We Get
into This Mess?, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 1927 (2020).
24
And, at best plays “defense” in response to the actions of other countries. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner,
The Implementation of BEPS: The United States IFA Branch National Report, in 102a IFA CAHIERS 849,
849 (2017).
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I. TRADITIONAL U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
The traditional policy discourse in the United States contrasts CEN with
Capital Import Neutrality (CIN),25 which is the idea that the fruits of domestic
investment should be taxed at the same rates regardless of the origin of the
investor. CIN is consistent with the need for a tax system to buttress
competitiveness that industry has long promoted with policymakers, with
source-based taxation and territorial or exemption systems to relieve double
taxation.26 Realistically, CEN and CIN could not be achieved
simultaneously,27 and therefore the classic policy literature focused on which
of these neutralities would better serve the interest of the relevant
constituency, when typically that constituency would be the entire world.28
In that context, economists generally preferred CEN because of its lesser
distortionary effects.29 The same general preference influenced U.S. policy,
both because of the dominant position of the United States in the world
economy and its position as the largest net capital exporter in the world.
Other countries, of course, had different interests and hence made different
choices. Those choices in turn forced the United States to soften its
preference, and include CIN-like measures in combination with the CEN
compatible measures,30 leading to the current hybrid rules.
Early academic critique of the Neutralities’ (CEN, CIN, etc.) discourse
mainly challenged the idea that policy should maximize world welfare. Most
notably, Peggy Musgrave argued that the United States should maximize its
own national welfare, explaining that National Neutrality (NN), or the grant
of deductions rather than credits to foreign taxes paid by American taxpayers
should therefore be the preferred policy.31 Contemporary academic critique

25

See Tyson, supra note 18, for discussions of the different international tax “neutralities.”

26

Territorial and exemption systems are not the same, yet they have often been used
interchangeably in the political discourse.
27

See Tyson, supra note 18.

28

Consequently, its policy aim was global welfare maximization.

29

See Graetz, supra note 16, at 272.

30

Culminating with I.R.C. § 245A.

31
See, e.g., PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME:
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 153 (1969).
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supported the national-perspective logic advocated by Musgrave,32 yet it has
not changed American policies. Economists added to the alphabet soup of
neutralities in recent years with the idea of Capital Ownership Neutrality
(CON), which also used the global welfare framework,33 and caught some
political attention of supporters of the switch to territoriality for a while, yet
without actual law reform. Legal academics demonstrated that the
Neutralities discourse, albeit useful for thinking about the implications of
different norms, cannot directly support one type of legal reform or another.34
Despite the political attention to the various theory-based reform
proposals,35 international tax reform came only in 2017. Such reform hardly
resembled any of the priorly proposed comprehensive reforms. The TCJA
was an assemblage of rule changes, some of which resembled prior
proposals, while others were completely new.
II. TCJA POLICY(?)
Articulating a coherent policy for the international tax provisions of the
TCJA is difficult. The reform includes provisions that stem from very
different, perhaps contradicting, thought processes. The rhetoric of the
Trump administration leading to the reform had promoted ideas such as
territorial taxation, incentives for investment in the United States, and,
correspondingly, disincentives for investment abroad.36 These ideas

32

See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 16, at 284–94.

33

See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax
Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 937, 956 (2004). Michael Devereaux advocated a slightly
different version. Michael P. Devereux, Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Principles
and Tax Policy Considerations, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 698, 702 (2008).
34

See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 17, at 638.

35

The Destination Based Cash Flow Tax proposal that seemed to be favored by politicians from
both sides of the aisle never materialized into an actual Congressional Bill. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach et
al., International Tax Planning under the Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax, 70 NAT’L TAX J. 783, 783
(2017).
36
Pete Sepp, Coalition Letter in Support of Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Conference Report, NAT’L
TAXPAYERS UNION (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.ntu.org/publications/ detail/coalition-letter-in-supportof-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-conference-report (citing the bill’s positive effect on domestic investment and
competitiveness internationally); Press Release, Mitch McConnell, More Tax Reform Benefits Coming
to Kentucky Families, Press Release (Jan. 16, 2018) (highlighting the TCJA’s passing as the primary
impetus for employers’ increased investment in workers).
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ostensibly materialized in the form of a participation exemption for foreign
dividends,37 the first significant exemption regime employed by the United
States.38 At the same time, the reform introduced the new GILTI regime that
expanded the traditional worldwide taxing regime of the United States.39
Moreover, a careful study of the interaction between the above rules suggests
that the scope of exemption may be small.40 The GILTI rules both
corresponded to the traditional CEN and departed from it by unprecedently
limiting the foreign tax credit permitted for GILTI to a formulated 80%.41
This formulary rule was joined by an even more explicitly formulary rule that
exempted from (GILTI) taxation an amount equal to 10% of the tangible
investment abroad of a taxpayer; both rules represent a departure from the
anti-formulary traditional policy of the United States.42
As an expansion of U.S. worldwide taxation, GILTI may be viewed as
a disincentive to investment abroad, yet its lower rates and features, such as
the exemption for 10% of the tangible investment abroad of a taxpayer, work
in the other direction. The same complexity of incentives characterizes the
other innovation of the TCJA, known as the BEAT regime.43 Surely, the
TCJA stirred the neatness of U.S. international tax policy like no earlier

37

I.R.C. § 245A.

38

It is common (even if inaccurate) in popular policymaking to equate territorial taxation and
exemption. Others have elaborated on the difference between these systems, a discourse that is beyond
the scope of this Essay. See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S.
Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455 (1999).
39

I.R.C. § 951A.

40

See Christine A. Davis, More Anti-Simplification: How PTI and GILTI Override the Section
245A Exemption and the U.S. Territorial Tax System, 71 MERCER L. REV. 471, 525–26 (2020).
41
The Internal Revenue Code includes multiple mechanisms that limit foreign tax credits, yet these
limits implement particular policies and are not in conflict with the general policy of CEN and the
elimination of double taxation. The key limitation regime of § 904 attempts to curb averaging (blending
income subject to high rate of taxation with lower taxed income), but when combined with the generous
carryover rules of § 904(c) its effect is primarily to defer the credit for taxpayers that do not engage in
excessive averaging. Other limitations, such as 901(j), deny the credit based on a competing (foreign)
policy. None of the current limitations is formulary, arbitrarily denying a credit for bona fide foreign taxes.
See also Ryan Finley, IRS Trying to Limit TCJA’s Damage to Foreign Tax Credit, 89 TAX NOTES INT’L
1332 (2018).
42
These were not, however, the first instances of use of formulas by the United States. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 864(e), (f).
43

See I.R.C. § 59A.
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reform. In general, however, the reform did not cause a major departure from
the hybrid nature of the U.S. international tax regime and its general
preference for CEN. All that occurred while the international tax regime was
forced to consider comprehensive reform to face the challenges presented to
it by the digital economy.
III. THE TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY DISCOURSE
The international tax regime has been seriously challenged by the ascent
of the digital economy, primarily because that regime generally relied upon
physical presence for the establishment of tax jurisdiction.44 This challenge
has recently topped the international tax agenda with the post-BEPS effort to
achieve a global consensus on the solution to this challenge.45 This challenge
is not new, however, as similar issues arose in the context of the taxation of
radio, satellite and other cross-border communications first,46 followed by
the treatment of catalogue sales,47 and the advent of electronic commerce.48
It was met with legal patches, more or less satisfactory,49 over the years,
patches that became evidently insufficient with the ascent of the digital
economy in the new millennium. To a large extent the BEPS project was
triggered by this challenge. The original BEPS document identified the issue
as a “key pressure area” that must be addressed by the BEPS project.50 The
BEPS Action Plan made the taxation of the digital economy the primary
action item on its agenda, although, soberly, promised solely a “report,”

44

Ben Jones et al., Taxing the Digital Economy: The Unilateral Approach, 1389 TAX J. 8, 8 (2018).

45

See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: ACTION 1, at 3–4
(2015) [hereinafter OECD, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT].
46

See, e.g., Comm’r v. Piedras Negras Broad. Co., 127 F.2d 260, 260–61 (5th Cir. 1942).

47

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 304–07 (1992).

48
See WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
TAXATION (2001).
49
Most notably the eventual inclusion of the electronic commerce chapter within the OECD Model
Commentaries on Article 5. See OCED, 2017 UPDATE TO THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION 113–15
(2017) (including the electronic commerce chapter within the OECD Model Commentaries on Article 5
(¶¶ 122–31)).
50

OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 47 (2013).
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rather than actual action items or reform recommendations.51 Indeed, the
BEPS project delivered a report, which eventually included exposition of
challenges in the taxation of the digital economy and of three possible
solutions: a virtual PE (a “nexus” approach), a withholding mechanism, and
an equalization levy.52 To put it plainly, it failed to provide a concrete
solution to the problem.
That challenge has not disappeared. Follow-up work occupied the next
three years that resulted in a 2018 “interim report” that reflected, above all,
the disagreement among BEPS countries (OECD and G20 nations) over the
desired solutions and the conflict between countries supporting “interim
measures” (i.e., turnover taxes) and those opposing such measures and urging
for focus on a sustainable long-term solution.53 Another interim document
was published in February 2019 as a public consultation document, changing
course and presenting two new perspectives: a U.S./U.K.54 proposal for a
solution focusing on the profit allocation rather than on the nexus decision
and a German/French proposal for an anti-base erosion tax based on the new
U.S. GILTI rules.55 Both these proposals primarily reflected the interests of
their makers: countries in which jurisdictions a large portion of MNE reside.
Therefore these proposals could not garner wide support.
The post-BEPS work on a solution to the challenges presented by the
digital economy was purportedly taken within the inclusive framework (i.e.,
with the cooperation of many non-BEPS countries, attempting to truly
achieve a global consensus on the matter) (Inclusive Framework).
Nevertheless, instead of the next document coming out of the Inclusive

51

OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 29 (2013).

52

OECD, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, supra note 45, at 13.

53

OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION—INTERIM REPORT 2018 INCLUSIVE
FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 20 (2018).
54
The proposal included two different solutions, with the United Kingdom emphasizing user
participation and the United States emphasizing marketing intangibles as key factors in the attribution of
profits under Article 7. Both solutions address only the concerns of residence countries about profit
shifting by multinational enterprises, and both essentially ignore the still unresolved issue of nexus without
physical presence.
55
OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY, PUBLIC
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 13 FEB.—6 MAR. 2019 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/publicconsultation-tax-challenges-of-digitalisation-13-14-march-2019.htm (accessed Dec. 18, 2019).
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Framework, the OECD released a mere Secretariat Proposal, reflecting the
lack of agreement among the stakeholders.56 The proposal published in Fall
2019 was released as two public consultation documents: the “Pillar One”
Secretariat proposal,57 and the “Pillar Two” proposal.58 The former
elaborated on a future virtual PE solution (including a new nexus definition
and new attribution of profits rules, while the latter essentially proposed a
minimum tax at the residence country level. Many have already commented
on these proposals, noting their many deficiencies, a critique that this Article
shares.59
Finally, in January 2020 the Inclusive Framework published a
“statement,” declaring its support of the OECD secretariat’s proposal, and a
decision to promote it toward a global consensus on the matter.60 The
statement acknowledges the deep disagreements over various aspects of the
proposals, especially over the so-called Pillar One proposal. The most
notable expression of this disagreement came in the form of a letter sent by
Secretary Mnuchin to the OECD, in which he expressed the United States’
wish to make Pillar One effectively elective.61 The letter caused confusion
about the United States’ position on Pillar One. This was only further
confounded by a follow-up letter sent to the ministers of partner OECD
economies calling for a pause in Pillar One talks. In addition to opposing the
implementation of DSTs, the letter also articulated the U.S. preference to
treat Pillar One as a safe harbor mechanism.62 The elective and safe harbor

56
It should be apparent to everybody that the entire body of work is conducted by the OECD—not
a legitimate international standard-setter, despite the attempt to present it as a product of the inclusive
framework. This is most apparent in the Pillar One proposal that is even named the “Secretariat Proposal.”
See generally Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” Under Pillar One, supra note 14.
57

Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” Under Pillar One, supra note 14.
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OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra note 14.

59
See, e.g., Andrés Báez Moreno & Yariv Brauner, Taxing the Digital Economy Post BEPS . . .
Seriously, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 121 (2019).
60
OECD, STATEMENT BY THE OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS ON THE TWO-PILLAR
APPROACH TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY
(2020).
61

See Letter from Steven T. Mnuchin, supra note 22.
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See Letter from Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to the Finance Ministers of France,
Italy, Spain, and the Chancellor of Exchequer of the U.K. (June 12, 2020).
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language represented inconsistent policies and have therefore been widely
interpreted as an attempt by the United States to chill the process.
The January 2020 statement further notes some progress on the work on
Pillar Two, without detail on concrete global agreements. It is also unclear
whether an agreement on Pillar Two could materialize without agreement on
Pillar One. As 2021 begins, the “pillars” paradigm continues to control the
international tax agenda. The Inclusive Framework seems to be hard at work
to complete the important details of the proposals, and, particularly, seems to
try to accommodate the U.S. position, relying on the hope that the incoming
Biden administration would be more amenable to an agreement on an
international consensus. It is clear, however, that the agenda is far from being
reduced to concrete proposals that countries can then convert into actual
agreement, in treaties.
IV. DIGITAL TAXES AND THE UNITED STATES
No evaluation of U.S. policy toward digital taxation would be complete
without preliminarily analyzing its unique interests, both economically, and
diplomatically. This Part begins with an overview of these interests and
supplements them with a look at how these interests have been protected
historically. This will lead us to a discussion of the present day, where the
United States is at odds with many of its allies over the future of digital
taxation.
There is no country in the world that has benefitted more from the fruits
of the digital economy than the United States. Of the five most valuable
companies in the world, all of them are digital giants63—and they are U.S.
based[?].64 Apple’s market cap alone dwarfs the annual GDP figures of all

63
At time of writing, it appears that Berkshire Hathaway (not a “digital firm”) is from time-to-time
valued more than Facebook, which is 5th on the list referred to.
64

(Mar. 12,
value/.

M. Szmigiera, Biggest Companies in the World by Market Capitalization 2020, STATISTA
2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-the-world-by-market-
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but 14 countries, including OECD allies like Mexico, Netherlands, Turkey,
and Switzerland.65
Though not a direct measure of digital economic prowess, the
technology revolution has produced enterprises whose assets consist of
substantial amounts of intellectual property.66 On this note, the United States
receives more royalty and licensing income for use of IP than any other
country in the world,67 with receipts totaling $128,931,000,000 annually,
second-place Japan receives less than half this at just $46,853,098,000.68
It is not a secret that the United States dominates this market which
yields a sizeable tax base worth protecting. However, what may come as a
surprise is how poorly this dominance squares with those of other OECD
allies. For better or for worse, the OECD is frequently thought of as a rich
country club.69 Regardless of this label’s veracity, it is evident that OECD
member nations’ economies and politics have remained relatively consistent
over time; most members are European, have highly developed economies
overseen by stable and (mostly) democratic political bodies, and, with a
couple exceptions, tend to consist of nations that were allied against the
Soviet Union. Though these generalizations remain unchanged today, the
digital revolution has complicated the United States’ relationship with other
developed countries.
Unlike the economic successes enjoyed by OECD nations throughout
the 20th and early 21st century, the digital economy remains largely

65
GDP (Current US$), THE WORLD BANK, NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
66
For example, Apple’s tangible book value is $5.09 out of a total share price of $111.81 (4.55%
of share value). Google’s tangible book value per share was $259.81 out of a total stock value at $1,465.46
(17% of total share value.) Alphabet Inc. Historical Data, YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/
quote/GOOG/history?p=GOOG (last visited Sept. 22, 2020); Apple Inc. Historical Data, YAHOO!
FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/AAPL/key-statistics?p=AAPL (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
67
Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property, Payments (BoP, Current US$), THE WORLD BANK,
https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD?Country=USA&indicator=898&viz=li
ne_chart&years=1960,2019.
68

Id.

69

See Buttonwood, What is the OECD?: What Does “A Club of Mostly Rich Countries” Actually
Do?, THE ECONOMIST (July 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/07/05/
what-is-the-oecd.
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unexploited in these developed nations, particularly in Europe. By its own
admission, the EU has struggled to develop its own technology industry.70
None of the top ten most valuable companies residing in the European Union
are highly digitalized firms. Instead, seven out of the ten are oil and
automobile manufacturing companies, with the remaining three dealing
primarily in financial services and insurance.71 Moreover, the European
digital data market is woefully miniature. Despite the EU’s population
dwarfing the United States by over 100 million people, its market is 2.5 times
smaller.72
The focused rhetoric around the inadequacies of the international tax
system’s ability to capture digital wealth may be a relatively modern debate,
but the challenges faced today were in large part predicted well before they
came to the forefront. As early as 1996, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
was exploring the potentially negative effects e-commerce would have on
revenue collection.73 This concern was mirrored by the OECD, which
published a report a year later that shed light on the increasing prevalence of
internet transactions.74
This attention prompted an agreement in 1998 oft referred to as the
“Ottawa Taxation Framework.”75 This foundational accord established the
position that traditional principles of international taxation should continue
to govern the increasingly internet-based economy but left the door open for

70
Europe has struggled to foster its own technology industry. Adam Satariano & Monika Pronczuk,
Europe, Overrun by Foreign Tech Giants, Wants to Grow Its Own, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/business/europe-digital-economy.html.
71
D. Clark, Largest European Companies Based on Revenue in 2020, STATISTA (Mar. 2, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/973337/largest-european-based-revenue/.
72

EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE EUROPEAN DATA MARKET MONITORING TOOL 9 (2020).

73

OFF. OF TAX POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SELECTED TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 21 (1996).
74
OECD, Measuring Electronic Commerce 3–4 (OECD Digit. Econ. Papers, No. 27); Arthur J.
Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal “World Tax Organization” Through National Responses
to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 136, 140 (2006).
75
Cockfield, supra note 74, at 141 n.10 (citing ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Joint
Declaration of Business and Government Representatives: Government/Business Dialogue on Taxation
and Electronic Commerce (Oct. 7, 1998), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/60/1932547.pdf).
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member nations to implement rules adapting the digital space to this aim so
long as they were founded on these traditional international tax principles.76
Though the United States is notorious for stopping just short of making
binding commitments to OECD pronouncements, it appears to have adopted
a policy well within the principles advocated in the Ottawa Framework. Vice
President Al Gore oversaw an interagency working group on electronic
commerce that met for 18 months and produced a proposal that laid out the
administration’s stance on key regulatory issues concerning the “World Wide
Web,” including taxation.77 On this point, the Clinton administration’s view
largely mimicked the OECD’s, stating that “no new taxes should be imposed
on Internet commerce,” and advocated instead for a system “consistent with
the established principles of international taxation.”78 Along this line, the
group expressed similar concerns that states would attempt to over-regulate
this area of commerce and responded three weeks later with the passing of
the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which prevented state and local governments
from imposing sales tax on internet service providers in exchange for internet
access.79 The Clinton administration’s “hands off” approach to internet
regulation was continued by President Bush, who extended the tax
moratorium all throughout his presidency.80 Even amidst sweeping reforms
enacted by the so-called Bush Tax Cuts, these changes left the international
rules mostly untouched.
Tech companies like Apple, Amazon, Google, and Facebook rose to
prominence following the internet “boom” of the early 2000s, which was
proceeded by the global recession of 2008–09. This brought tax to the
forefront of U.S. politics, but the legislation that followed was primarily
aimed at stimulating the domestic economy. The Obama administration
extended the Bush Tax Cuts (with modifications), increased spending on

76

Id.

77

The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, CLINTON WHITEHOUSE ARCHIVES, https://
clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/textonly/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
78

Id.
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See Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1100, 112 Stat. 2681, 2719 (1998).

80

Obama would later sign into law a permanent bar on the internet tax in 2016.
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public works, and provided tax code relief for individuals.81 But by 2012, a
ballooning deficit had turned its attention to international tax concerns, where
it acknowledged the tricks being exploited by MNEs to avoid paying their
“fair share.”82 The G-20 followed this up at its summit where leaders
endorsed the OECD’s renewed focus on base erosion already explored in Part
III.83
President Obama’s support of BEPS was likely premised on the belief
that it advanced his own goals at broadening the corporate tax base and
strengthening the country’s stagnant international tax regime.84 Yet by the
end of 2015 it appeared to both GOP lawmakers and the Treasury that the
BEPS initiative looked more like a European revenue grab disguised as
multilateral reform.85 Puzzlingly, though President Obama was somewhat
vocal about the EU’s efforts to regulate American tech companies, he joined
the G-20 chorus in its approval of the OECD’s BEPS’ recommendations on
November 16, 2015.86 The United States effectively took the position that its
laws were already compatible with the dictates of the BEPS agreements.87
President Trump’s foreign policy actions might lead one to conclude the
current conflict over digital taxation is a byproduct of the former

81
ROBERTON WILLIAMS, TAX POL’Y CENTER, PRESIDENT-ELECT OBAMA’S TAX AND STIMULUS
PLANS (2009), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30036/411816-president-electobama-s-tax-and-stimulus-plans.pdf.
82

President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012).

83

G20 Leaders Declaration, OBAMA WHITEHOUSE ARCHIVES (June 19, 2012), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/19/g20-leaders-declaration.
84
Cf. THE WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR
BUSINESS TAX REFORM (2012).
85
Michael Mandel, Opinion, Obama’s Corporate Tax Blunder, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/opinion/obamas-corporate-tax-blunder.html; Hillary Flynn & Toby
Eckert, U.S. Departs from the Rest on BEPS, POLITICO (June 15, 2015), https://www.politico.com/
tipsheets/morning-tax/2015/06/us-departs-from-the-rest-on-beps-medical-device-tax-repeal-bill-takesswing-at-obamacare-ahead-of-king-v-burwell-clinton-opaque-over-her-tax-reform-ideas-212543; Hatch
to Hold Finance Hearing on OECD BEPS Reports, U.S. S. COMM. ON FIN. (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www
.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-to-hold-finance-hearing-on-oecd-beps-reports.
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See James Vincent, Obama Accuses EU of Attacking American Tech Companies Because It
‘Can’t Compete,’ FIN. TIMES: THE VERGE (Feb. 17, 2015, 7:06 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/2/
17/8050691/obama-our-companies-created-the-inter net.
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Brauner, supra note 24, at 856, at ¶ 2.1.1.
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administration’s pugnaciousness. However valid this may be, it overlooks the
consistencies between BEPS concerns and their corresponding provisions in
the TCJA passed by the Trump administration. In fact, the TCJA appeared to
mitigate several concerns highlighted by BEPS,88 but as the Europeans have
now realized, this does not necessarily benefit them.
The reality is that the hallmark features of the TCJA like GILTI, FDII,
BEAT, and the participation exemption, have been viewed as reactions to
BEPS Action 1.89 Moreover, it appears these measures have been met with
some degree of success, although much of it may be attributed to the lowering
of the corporate tax rate. The law prompted some of the biggest players in
the digital economy to repatriate intangible assets and cash back to the United
States.90
Though there are some indications to the contrary,91 Europe’s frosty
reaction to the TCJA92 was based on the belief that it negatively affected its
tax base. Prior to the TCJA, U.S. MNEs reported over 40% of their foreign
profits in the Netherlands, Ireland, and Luxembourg.93 Of the top ten most

88
Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: Competition or Coordination: Responses to the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act, 89 TAX NOTES INT’L 209 (2018) (examining international provisions of TCJA as responses to
competitive actions taken by other countries under the guise of the BEPS project).
89
See Aparna Mathur, The U.S. Counterpunch to the OECD BEPS Project, AM. ENTER. INST. IFC
REP., July 20, 2018, at 40; Daisuke Wakabayashi & Brian X. Chen, Apple, Capitalizing on New Tax Law,
Plans to Bring Billions in Cash Back to U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/01/17/technology/apple-tax-bill-repatriate-cash.html; Zoe Sagalow, Survey Says More Overseas
Earnings Bound for U.S. Due to Tax Law, 158 TAX NOTES 1692 (2018).
90
Wakabayashi & Chen, supra note 89. Apple alone moved some $252 billion in cash back. Other
giants like Microsoft, Cisco, and Alphabet (Google) followed suit, see Sagalow, supra note 89.
91
For example, some literature suggests that the law’s emphasis on using tangible, depreciable
property to lessen the bite of GILTI results in the intangibles staying in the foreign jurisdiction but
increasing tangible business activities.
92
Shortly after the bill passed, Pierre Moscovici, Tax Commissioner of the European Commission,
urged the European Union to challenge the FDII and BEAT rules. FDII is being resisted on the grounds
that its beneficial treatment of domestic sales of intangibles constitutes an illegal export subsidy under
WTO rules. Other parts of the law, including BEAT, are being challenged as violations of tax treaties,
particularly on Article 24 (discrimination) grounds.
93
Briefing Book, Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: What are the Consequences of the New U.S.
International Tax System?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-areconsequences-new-us-international-tax-system (May 2020).

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2021.131 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

Vol. 18 2021 | Thinking Like A Source State |

243

popular foreign destinations for these companies to park profits, half were in
Europe, and all of them OECD members.94
Accordingly, it is no coincidence that the years following the enactment
of the TCJA have been peppered with the imposition of DSTs, which the
United States has vehemently opposed from the start. When the EU first
floated the idea of DSTs in October of 2018, Treasury Secretary Steven
Mnuchin argued that such a tax singled out the industry and forced it to play
by a different rulebook.95
Of course, like all geopolitical tax issues, the U.S. protest over DSTs is
rooted in their potential damage to the U.S. tax base. However, there are other
legal and economic factors that prop up the U.S. opposition. As to the former,
the U.S. objections to DSTs echo the conclusion already reached by the
OECD’s Task Force on the Digital Economy, which issued reports
concluding it was “difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence the digital
economy from the rest of the economy.”96 Furthermore, this position is
consistent with the founding principles of digital taxation agreed to in the
Ottawa Framework.97 Then on the economic side, many have remarked that
the real harms of DSTs fall on the implementing country itself more than the
technical payor.98
More recent additions to the OECD’s BEPS debacle lend even more
credence to U.S. objections. The BEPS January 2020 statement on the TwoPillar Approach unveiled a digital taxation framework that by its own
admission constituted a “New Taxing Right.”99 For the United States, this
served as a blatant deviation from the more conservative approaches that

94
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad (USDIA), Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises (MNEs),
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop (last visited Apr. 14, 2021)
(publishing Selected Data by Country 2009–2018 for All Foreign Affiliates).
95
Press Release, Sec’y of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary Mnuchin Statement on Digital
Economy Taxation Efforts (Oct. 25, 2018).
96

OECD, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, supra note 45, at 12.
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Specifically, it is difficult to square the OECD’s “New Taxing Right” with earlier agreements
endorsing traditional approaches to internet taxation.
98
Elizabeth Schulze, France’s Digital Tax Could Hurt Consumers More Than Tech Companies,
CNBC (July 12, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/12/france-digital-tax-could-hurt-consumersmore-than-tech-companies.html.
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previous agreements advocated, and confirmed suspicions that BEPS was no
longer the benign instrument its OECD allies purported it to be.
The chronological walkthrough of the U.S. position on digital taxation
juxtaposed with the purported position of the OECD illustrates two things.
For one, it illustrates BEPS’ flagrant departure from what was formerly a
surprisingly coherent global consensus on the future of digital taxation. The
second implication from this timeline conveys the obvious, yet too often
disregarded, political motivations of countries to simply increase their tax
base. Countries are always adjusting rules to do this on a unilateral basis, but
if the same aim can be accomplished under the guise of multilateral
cooperation—all the better.
As efforts continue to modernize international tax rules to comport with
the digital era, several pitfalls arise for both the United States and its OECD
allies. The United States walks an awkward line in the digital tax debate. On
the one hand, it has joined the global bandwagon campaigning for reform of
the early 20th century tax rules that inadequately govern the increasingly
intangible commerce of present day. On the other hand, the United States has
benefitted more from digital entrepreneurship than any other country in the
world, resulting in a sizeable tax base worth protecting.
U.S. status as a net capital importer calls into question the country’s
longstanding preference toward residence-based taxation. But this critique
becomes complicated by the digital tax debate. As we have noted, the digital
space is dominated by companies residing in the United States.
Consequently, it stands to reason the United States will continue to prefer
taxpayers hold intangible assets where they reside.
However, a source-based policy preference is not exactly misguided
either. In fact, it contraindicates DST-implementing countries’ claim that
they merely desire to tax where “value creation” occurs. Take internet
advertising for example. In 2018, marketers were estimated to spend about
$39.1 billion on programmatic advertisements to Americans.100 Despite
constituting roughly 1/20th of the world’s population, this amount represents
well over half of programmatic ad spending worldwide.101 The U.S. digital

100

GLOBAL DATA MARKET SIZE 2016–2018, ONAUDIENCE.COM 14 (2018).
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advertising market as a whole is worth four times Europe’s.102 These figures
are even more surprising when considering the overwhelmingly nonAmerican makeup of common advertising platforms. Almost 90% of
Facebook users, for example, come from outside the United States and
Canada. Of Twitter’s 330 million active users, only 60 million are
American.103 Even if we step outside the value provided by users of digital
services, the trend continues in the U.S. favor. Take the video streaming
market, it is projected to receive nearly half of its revenue from the United
States this year.104 Online retail is a similar story, last year Amazon reported
over $170 billion in revenue from North America and just under $75 billion
in the rest of the world.105
These statistics lead one to ponder whether the OECD’s apparent
preference for taxing digital commerce at the source will ultimately benefit
the United States, as the numbers indicate the “value creation” generated by
U.S. internet users far surpasses that of its OECD neighbors. At some point,
non-U.S. digital firms will come about. Accordingly, given the maturity of
the U.S. digital economy, it stands to reason that their wealth will be derived
largely in the United States, which strengthens the argument for the source
taxation approach.
Ultimately, there is a lack of candid discussion over the downfalls of
both arguments. U.S. disengagement from the international digital tax forum
only increases partner countries’ incentive to establish patchwork unilateral
measures that harm both sides. Going forward, the U.S. must accept the
inevitability that any viable proxy for digital wealth (including that advocated
by this Essay) may result in a reduction of U.S. tax revenue from digital
firms. However, this concession ultimately allows the substantial size of the
U.S. digital market to be used to its advantage by forcing negotiating partners
to accept the sobering reality that by all suitable measures of digital wealth,
the United States retains its overwhelmingly dominant position in the digital
market. This would allow the United States to change the current game
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Id.
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H. Tankovska, Leading Countries Based on Number of Twitter Users as of January 2021,
STATISTA (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/242606/number-of-active-twitter-users-insele cted-countries/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
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resulting in no winners to one that gives it the final say in what crumbs it
distributes from its bountiful mass of digital tax revenue.
CONCLUSION: RECALIBRATING THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
The interests of the United States in the international tax realm have
been poorly communicated over the years. A precise articulation of these
interests requires a precise articulation of the goals of such policy. We want
to increase the welfare of U.S. taxpayers, but, at the same time, we want to
ensure the success of the U.S. MNEs. The exact formula to balance the two,
and even before that to identify the benefactors of the policy, are beyond the
scope of this Article. It is possible, however, to establish international tax
policy that would be accommodating of any such balance. Assuming that
there is no political support for a complete overhaul of the international tax
rules of the United States, or an international consensus for a similar overhaul
of the fundamentals of the international tax regime, this Article proposes an
approach that would ensure fair taxation of U.S. MNEs, and at the same time
safeguard U.S. taxation of inbound investment in the United States. This
approach acknowledges the dominance of the United States as an exporter of
capital and high technology while not neglecting to account for its being a
net capital importer and a major market for digital goods and services.
The key factor in this plan would be to increase source taxation of the
fruits of inbound investment. This practically means the imposition of a
withholding tax on all base eroding payments related to U.S. investment of
foreign persons who are not otherwise paying tax in the United States.106 The
current rules already impose such a tax on non-business income at the rate of
30%, often reduced by tax treaties. We propose to extend the withholding
requirement to all base eroding (i.e., deductible) business payments.107 The
rate should perhaps be lower to balance the interests of the source and
residence countries. The United States should accept similar taxes imposed
on its MNEs (assuming, again, that such taxes are similarly low) in other
countries to ensure fairness, legitimacy, effective network against tax
avoidance, and perhaps eventually to reach a global consensus over this new

106
That is, in particular non-residents with income effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business.
We would extend the election in I.R.C. § 871(d) to all income types, which would allow every investment
to be equally taxed, on a net basis, in the United States. For additional details, see a corresponding proposal
made more generally in the context of BEPS. Moreno & Brauner, supra note 59, at 6.
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All, not only the limited payments subject to the complex BEAT rules.

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2021.131 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

Vol. 18 2021 | Thinking Like A Source State |

247

“deal.” This withholding tax should be creditable (or exempt) by all countries
that operate under the existing international tax regime, including the United
States. Treaty adjustments will be required, but the same is true for all the
other proposed solutions. Finally, the United States would commit to the
abovementioned reciprocity only in exchange for the elimination of all the
new taxes imposed by other jurisdictions in the disguise of “interim
measures,” “digital services taxes,” etc.
Secondly, we propose that the U.S. strengthen residence taxation of
MNEs with a deferral eliminating single tax.108 This tax could be a
“minimum tax” or, better, a final single tax on all outbound business. In the
current, uncoordinated international tax regime it seems that preservation of
the foreign tax credit would be superior to selective exemption in such a
system, but in a more ordered future this may change.109
Note that despite the assumption above, the proposed system would also
work well in transition with possible overhauls of the international tax rules,
all of which envision refocus of the regime to the source or host countries.
This was true to the destination-based cash flow tax and would be true to any
formulary apportionment reform. It would also nicely compliment a reform
adding a value-added tax to the U.S. arsenal of taxes, which is perhaps the
most likely of reforms in the post-COVID-19 era. All these eventualities
would be consistent with the overall position of the United States elaborated
in this Article.
In conclusion, this Article advocates a refinement of U.S. international
tax policy that would fit its complex position in the increasingly digitalized
economy. First, and foremost, reform should ensure sufficient taxation at
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This is standardized corporate tax that we know and use currently.
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See the various articles by Cliff Fleming, Robert Peroni and Steve Shay demonstrating the
superiority of deferral eliminating to exemption and other similar proposals. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr. et al., Point: The United States Should Tax U.S. Corporations on Their Worldwide Income, 21 ABA
TAX SEC. NEWSL. 14 (2001). Note also that the proposal may resemble at first glance the OECD’s twopillar approach, which should also benefit, in terms of revenue, the United States, yet it substantively
defers from that proposal in at least four dimensions: first, it applies a withholding tax rather than a
formulaic new tax at source; second, it applies the existing corporate tax, extended by the elimination of
deferral, rather than a new, necessarily complex minimum tax à la GILTI; third, it does not ringfence the
digital economy and therefore does not require always problematic scope defining definitions; and fourth,
its implementation should be simpler and efficiency-promoting since it is based on the matching of taxes
and deductions, promoting also voluntary information furnishing by taxpayers. For more, see supra notes
54–60.
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source, and be compatible with the U.S. status as a net capital importer and
the world’s premier market for the goods and services of the digital economy.
But, the United States should still maintain its devotion to neutral (as
possible) residence taxation, and ideally improve it by eliminating deferral.
Co-opting our trade partners to enact similar reforms would further facilitate
the system’s finetuning and provide the international tax regime with the
legitimacy it so desperately needs. Unlike previous reforms and proposals,
this Article does not advocate fragmented, rough justice compromises, but
rather full expansion of the tax net with comprehensive elimination of double
taxation (by ending deferral). However, we do not presume this to be the only
solution, but merely assert that the principles outlined here are crucial to any
successful framework to come.
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